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The feasibility of collective and individual policymaking has dominated the study of climate 
policy. This paper explores how domestic implementation experiences affect national 
preferences and climate policy reform. The case in point is EU climate policy, which is now 
poised for the first full climate-policy cycle – from initiation and decision-making on targets 
and policies for 2020 via domestic implementation in 28 member-states to adoption of 
reform for 2030. Even though the EU is a “unique” political system facing distinctive energy 
challenges,2 its experience regarding large-scale climate policy may hold valuable lessons for 
other actors, highlighting opportunities and pitfalls in responding to the long-term challenge 
of climate change. Can climate policies be strengthened without creating losers who may try 
to block subsequent policy development? Can policies be designed so as to promote 
domestic implementation and lower-carbon transformations in the long term?   With the 
Paris Agreement, the challenge is formidable: to facilitate and shape a global transformation 
towards the 2oC target and the intended 1.5oC target. This will necessitate policies that can 
stimulate governments and societal actors to adopt increasingly more ambitious targets and 
policies. In essence, institutionalized cooperation must gain momentum through a “snowball 
effect” that can generate positive feedback from implementation, facilitating further steps.  
Poland has stood out as the “least climate ambitious” of the EU member-states since 
it entered the Union in 2004 (Skjærseth, 2014). One important reason is that indigenous coal 
accounts for nearly 90% of the country’s electricity production and 50% of its total CO2 
emissions. Poland is the EU’s sixth largest member-state by population, and has often served 
as the informal leader of some of the ten Central and East European countries (CEECs)  – 
mainly the Visegrad countries. Poland can serve as a critical case within the EU for how 
implementation experiences affect the preferences of “laggards” and reformed EU climate 
policies.  
                                                             
1 This paper is based on a larger research project on EU climate and energy policies in collaboration with Per 
Ove Eikeland, Lars. H. Gulbrandsen and T. Jevnaker. See Skjærseth, et al, 2016. The author would also like to 
thank I. Ydersbond and S. Andresen for constructive comments.  
2 The EU is the world’s largest energy importer, its energy-import dependency rising since the mid-1990s. In 
2012, 53 per cent of EU energy consumption was linked to imports. 
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 Various strands of theories on EU policymaking do not include domestic 
implementation experiences in explaining preferences and outcomes. Different variants of 
liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) emphasize domestic preference aggregation, but tend to 
“black box” implementation processes (Moravcsik, 1998,1999; Bickerton et al, 2015). 
Supranationalism is mainly concerned with the autonomous role of the EU institutions 
(Pollack, 1997; Sweet, 1997). Multilevel-governance (MLG) emphasize that influence goes 
both from the EU level to member states and from member states to the EU, but does not 
specify how these influences are linked by implementation experiences  (Marks et. al, 1996; 
Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Fairbrass and Jordan 2004). What we need is a fresh approach to 
EU policy reform that can combine MLG with a policy-cycle ‘feedback’ approach. 
 The next section outlines the framework for exploring the links between 
implementation experiences, national preferences and policy reform. Section three applies 
the framework to explore implementation experiences in Poland and subsequent change in 
preferences. Section four analyses the consequences of preference change for the 2030 EU 
outcome, followed by a concluding analysis in section five. Data comprise a number of 
interviews with polish experts, societal, and governmental actors and secondary sources.  
 
2. Implementation experiences, national preferences, and EU policy reform 
     
The policy reform concept emerges from a policy cycle approach in which reform follows 
policy initiation, adoption, and implementation. EU member-states are likely to assume a 
more prominent role vis à vis the EU institutions when policies are reformed compared to 
when they are initiated. The reason is that ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ experiences from domestic 
implementation will start to materialize before policy reform. Experience with, and learning 
from, implementation of existing policies is thus likely to reduce uncertainty and to affect 
national preferences on new long-term targets and policies.  
A reasonable starting point for EU policy reform is that actors have limited 
information on the causes and consequences of problems and solutions in early stages of the 
policy cycle. Typically, actors enter a cooperative process by discovering, inventing, and 
exploring their own interests as well as possible solutions (Underdal, 1991; Young, 1991). 
4 
 
New information can give rise to learning processes that change basic policy preferences 
even if interest definitions are deeply rooted in domestic settings (Eising, 2002). Accordingly, 
reform of existing policies will typically involve less uncertainty about member-state 
preferences than is the case in earlier stages of the policy cycle.  
So how then can implementation experiences affect member-state preferences?  The 
policy feedback literature has grappled with the “from effect to feedback” questions. Policy 
feedback can be defined as effects on the original actor’s preferences and the reformed 
policy in question (see e.g. Jordan and Matt, 2014 for a review). These feedback effects can 
be positive or negative, intentional, or unintentional, and be categorized in various types. 
From an EU perspective, we need to link feedback to decentralized implementation in the 
member states. Implementation can be defined as the process of converting EU policies into 
domestic legislation, policies, and measures resulting in behavioral change among domestic 
actors that cause the problem, provide solutions, or both (Skjærseth et. al, 2016). In the 
language of EU studies, this is commonly referred to as legal transposition, application, and 
enforcement (Treib, 2008). The extent to which implementation experiences affect national 
preferences depends on the “distance” between EU requirements and domestic status quo. 
If EU requirements equal status quo, domestic implementation experiences and policy 
learning are unlikely to emerge and affect preferences for policy reform. Given a certain 
“distance,” it will depend on how EU policies affect domestic politics.  
A simple model of domestic politics explains responses to common EU policies by the 
state, or government itself, society, and the relationship between the state and society, 
where domestic institutions channel influence through electoral and corporate channels. 
Within this broad model, I narrow in on four pathways through which EU policies can affect 
domestic politics (see also Di Lucia and Kronsell, 2010; Skjærseth et al., 2016). First, EU 
policies can affect the distribution of costs and benefits among societal actors. When costs 
are concentrated to specific subgroups of society while benefits are broadly distributed, 
there is reason to expect high incentives for opposing new and more ambitious reformed 
policies. Conversely, when costs are distributed and benefits are concentrated, there is 
reason to expect high incentives for support.   
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Second, domestic actors’ perceptions of affectedness may deviate more or less 
systematically from actual affectedness. This may lead to an interpretative effect caused by 
the “shadow of the future” in which current policies are seen as the start of a long-term 
repeated policy process towards decarbonization. If long term targets are perceived as 
threatening, opposition to strengthening policies can be expected even though current 
policies do not entail net-costs. Alternatively, implementation of climate policies and 
repeated policy cycles may over time lead to social norms based on the needs of future 
generations or the climate actions of others (Elster, 1989).  
Implementation of EU policies can be channeled to decision-makers through 
domestic institutional arrangements in various ways. The institutions channeling corporate 
influences between the state and society can enhance or close access for new groups or 
alliances seeking to exert influence on policy reform, such as the renewable energy industry. 
In some cases, segments of society may be described as social blocs characterized by tight 
alliances among ministries, parliamentary committees, and industrial sectors (Skidmore and 
Hudson 1993). If such blocs see implementation of EU policies as threatening to their core 
interests, then initiatives for stepping up reformed policies are likely to meet severe 
resistance. Through the numerical channel, lawmakers must – at least to some extent – 
respond to and promote constituency interests to be re-elected, which is an important 
concern for example concerning electricity prices or taxes. Finally, political and 
administrative institutions are also likely to be affected by EU implementation processes. 
New EU policies may deepen fragmentation or spur greater coordination, in turn affecting 
the coherency of national preferences on reformed policies and the likelihood of affecting 
EU outcomes.   
Against this backdrop, a preference for strengthening and reinforcing EU climate and 
related energy policies for 2030 can be expected if member-states experience positive 
consequences from implementing policies for 2020. Benefits can include alleviation of 
energy-security concerns; side-payments to compensate sectors that stand to lose from 
stepping up climate policy; and synergies like innovation, employment creation, and 
reduction of other problems such as air pollution. The absence of such benefits, combined 
with implementation challenges and costs, is expected to lead to opposition to reforms 
aimed at more ambitious EU-level policies. Mixed experiences will most likely lead to 
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preferences for re-packing of policies based on specific instruments, subject to positive 
experiences. Re-packing may in turn lead to stagnation, where elements of new policy 
combination may point towards decline and reinforcement. We can accordingly imagine at 
least three outcomes of climate policy reform: Decline, stagnation or reinforcement. 
Ambitiousness in terms GHG reduction will serve as the main criterion for these outcomes.  
 






Mainly negative: No or limited 
translation of EU-level envisaged 
benefits; considerable domestic 
implementation challenges 
Opposition Decline 
Mixed: Varying translation of EU-
level envisaged benefits; varying 
domestic implementation 
challenges 
Re-packing  Stagnation (+/-) 
Mainly positive: Good translation 
of EU-level envisaged benefits; 
few domestic implementation 
challenges 
Support  Reinforcement 
Based on Skjærseth et al., 2016 
How then can we verify that implementation experiences affect preferences and policy 
reform? I propose a stepwise process tracing approach. First, we need to map national 
preferences when EU policies are adopted in the first place. This will represent the baseline. 
Second, the implementation of these policies should be examined with a focus on “distance” 
and domestic implementation experiences. Third, we need to trace the link between 
implementation experiences and (change in) preferences on reformed policies. This would 
have to show that new preferences have emerged as a result of implementation 
experiences. As preferences can change also as a result of other reasons such as EU 
interactions, these preferences should emerge before negotiations on reformed policies. 
Finally, we need to trace the link between change in preferences and the outcome of 
reformed EU policies.  This exercise can also reveal aspects of the policy reform that cannot 
be traced back to changes in preferences, but require different explanations. For example, 
                                                             
3 Applies under unanimity requirements. Table 1 can be applied to different cases or different policy cycles. 
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the EU institutions and negotiations at the EU level can shape member-state preferences 
independently of domestic sources (Eising, 2002). 
 
3. Implementation experiences and preference formation in practice 
 
Polish preferences and the climate and energy package 
 
In March 2007, the European Council unanimously adopted the EU 20-20-20 targets: to cut 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and increase the share of renewables and energy efficiency 
by 20% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels.  The GHGs target would be stepped up to 30% if 
an adequate climate treaty could be agreed. In the run-up to the adoption of these targets, 
Poland had expressed its preference for removal of the pledge for unilateral EU action if the 
international negotiations in Copenhagen on a successor to the Kyoto Protocol should fail 
(Eikeland, 2012). Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic also voiced concerns on how 
efforts to reach the climate target would be shared. Moreover, these coal-dependent states 
worried that a binding target on renewables could force them to invest in more expensive 
energy sources (Skjærseth, 2013).  
In January 2008, the Commission formally proposed the climate and energy package 
of binding policies for achieving the 20–20–20 targets by 2020 as a first step towards a 
decarbonized economy by 2050. The core package negotiated in the course of 2008 included 
a strengthening and harmonization of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) covering large 
industrial emitters; a decision on effort-sharing (ESD) among member-states for non-ETS 
sectors, like transport and agriculture; a renewable energy directive (RED) for promoting 
renewable energy sources; and the world’s first legal framework for safe capture and 
storage of carbon (CCS). 
To make the climate and energy package politically feasible at the EU level, it was 
based on compensation to poorer member-states mainly from Central and Eastern Europe.  
Binding national targets in the non-ETS sectors (ESD) and for the share of EU energy 
consumption from renewable energy sources (RED) were mainly based on GDP/capita. 
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Auctioning revenues from the revised ETS should compensate lower-income member-states 
through a “solidarity fund.” Combined, these policies were intended to ensure fairness in 
effort-sharing. The emphasis on CCS was meant to provide a particularly attractive solution 
for the coal industry and consequently for Poland. 
In addition to burden-sharing, the climate and energy package aimed at providing 
new low-carbon opportunities by reducing the need for imported hydrocarbons and 
strengthen energy security, creating new “green” jobs and stimulate energy technological 
innovation. A European strategic energy technology plan (SET-Plan) was proposed, to lower 
the cost of clean energy and place the EU at the forefront of the low-carbon technology 
sector. 
In Warsaw, the first government of Donald Tusk had taken office in October 2007. It 
entered the negotiations with a reluctant but somewhat mixed attitude. On the one hand, 
Poland’s GHG emissions had dropped significantly since 1989 as a result of modernization of 
the economy, and the Polish focus on affordable and secure energy supply as a major oil and 
gas importer from Russia was in line with EU priorities. On the other hand, Poland opposed 
the EU ETS, which would punish coal severely by carbon pricing, and the EU’s ambition of 
showing leadership-by-example in the upcoming international climate negotiations in 
Copenhagen. The stage was set for hard negotiations between the EU and Poland on the 
proposed package. Poland coordinated its position with the Visegrad Group (V-4), which 
from 1991 came to include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.4  
Negotiations on this package proposal gained momentum from July 2008, when 
France took over the EU Presidency from Slovenia. The package was to be adopted in the 
European Council by unanimity in one single round. Poland fronted the opposition, and 
preferred three specific changes to the proposed revision of the EU ETS: price controls in the 
form of a carbon-price ceiling; free allowances for electric power plants,5 and more financial 
assistance from auctioning revenues under the EU ETS. The coalition of many CEECs, headed 
by Poland, threatened to veto the whole package if the energy situation in these countries 
were not taken sufficiently into account (Ancygier, 2013:126). To prevent this, Commission 
representatives travelled to Warsaw to “sell” the climate and energy package by empha-
                                                             
4 http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/presidency-programs/2008-2009-polish-110412. Accessed 30.01.14. 
5 Poland particularly opposed full auctioning from 2013. 
9 
 
sizing synergies and new low-carbon opportunities. On December 12, 2008, a final 
compromise was reached on the EU ETS. Poland and other CEECs won concessions that 
would postpone the phase-in of auctioning for power plants and increase the solidarity fund 
from 10% to 12% of the auctioned allowances – well below the demanded 30%. And finally, 
Poland did not get a carbon-price ceiling accepted.  
The negotiations on the CCS proposal introduced significant changes in measures for 
incentivizing CCS (Chiavari, 2010).  After long and complex negotiations, it was agreed that 
300 million allowances from the ETS New Entrants’ Reserve (NER-300) would be set aside to 
co-finance up to 12 commercial CCS demonstration projects and new renewable energy 
technologies. Poland was positive to CCS funding, but opposed CO2 emissions limits on 
power stations, to force the use of CCS on future coal power.  Concerning the renewables, 
the government sent somewhat mixed signals. Poland was positive to co-firing biomass and 
coal, but was also concerned about increases in electricity prices. Poland argued for a 
somewhat lower share than the proposed 15% increase in renewables for Poland (Ancygier, 
2013:333), although this demand was put forward with significantly less intensity compared 
to the ETS derogations. For sectors outside the ETS included in the Effort Sharing Decision, 
Poland accepted a generous national target of 14% increase in GHG emissions by 2020 
compared to 2005. 
The upshot was great but varying “distance” between domestic status quo and Polish 
preferences put forward with differing intensities and the negotiated outcome. Poland 
strongly opposed a more ambitious ETS and managed to get several concessions, but these 
were far from meeting Polish demands. On RED, Poland had to accept a somewhat stricter 
renewables target than preferred. Poland had no experience with CCS, but welcomed the 
CCS Directive and the NER-300. The proposed Polish ESD target of 14% increase in emissions 







Implementing the climate and energy package in Poland 
 
The climate and energy package prepared by the European Commission was based on a 
thorough assessment of how the different proposals would work together to level the costs 
among member-states. However, these EU-level calculations did not include distributional 
consequences within the member-states.  
 Concerning affected societal actors, the EU ETS and the RED would affect mainly the 
country’s electric power and energy-intensive industry. Electric power producers and 
energy-intensive industry were united in their opposition to the EU climate and energy 
package. Together with the major power producers, the Polish Chamber of Commerce—
representing over 150 business organizations—prepared an assessment of EU climate and 
energy policies (EnergSys, 2012). For the energy sector, electricity prices were expected to 
increase with implementation of the current 2020 package. The annual costs for Poland 
would rise sharply, weakening the competitiveness of its industry, in turn leading to lower 
economic activity and higher unemployment.  
The benefits identified are related to the development of low-emission technologies, 
but most of these will remain based on imports. The renewables industry (other than co-
firing) is dominated by foreign companies and depends on technology import.6 Innovation 
and first-mover advantages in wind or solar were not seen as viable options. The only case in 
which Polish companies can create added value on a bigger scale is in biomass technologies. 
In essence, costs will be concentrated to the major economic sectors, whereas the benefits 
to these sectors and to society are deemed negligible.  
Societal actors’ opposition and reluctance to the EU climate and energy package for 
2020 is difficult to understand from actual ‘negative’ affectedness. Polish societal actors 
view EU 2020 policies as part of the EU’s long-term decarbonization effort by 2050. This 
makes their perceptions of the long-term costs the most important concern. The EU climate 
and energy package has not yet significantly affected Polish ETS or non-ETS sectors due to 
the economic crisis, falling emissions, low carbon prices, free allowances for energy-
                                                             
6 The most active foreign investors are Vortex, EDP, RWE, E.ON, CEZ, GDF Suez, Mitsui & J. Power, Acciona (wind farms), 
Dalkia (biomass combustion), Poldanor, AXZON Group (biogas plants). Also some Polish actors are investing in renewables, 
e.g. Enea, Energa, Tauron, PGE. See: http://www.paiz.gov.pl/sectors/renewable_energy. Accessed 09.04.14.  
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intensive industry, and auctioning derogations for electric power industry using co-firing of 
biomass and coal as their main renewable strategy.7 The EU ETS has not proved a real threat 
yet to Polish coal, but rather a source of government revenues from auctioning emission 
allowances.  
Societal resistance has been effectively channeled to governmental decision-makers. 
First, as EU climate and energy policies are blamed for increase in electricity prices, these 
policies are unpopular among the voting public. The people have high expectations of 
improving their standards of living after the socialist years—and lawmakers tend to respond 
to and promote constituency interests concerning electricity prices. The government focuses 
on the negative effects of EU climate and energy policies for high-carbon economies, with a 
significantly greater slump in household consumption than the EU average (Boratyński et al., 
2014).8 The concern with negative consequences of EU climate policies is reinforced by the 
relatively low societal concern for climate change and willingness to take action in Poland 
(Ministry of Environment, 2013; Eurobarometer, 2014). Illustrative here is also Poland’s veto 
to the Commission’s energy- and low carbon roadmaps for 2050. Poland’s veto was 
welcomed by representatives of all parties represented in in Polish Parliament (Skjærseth, 
2014). In an online survey just after the veto, 91% of the public respondents approved the 
veto decision (Ancygier, 2013:127; 182).  The counterforces in favor of an ambitious climate 
policy are regarded weak. The environmental movement is active on climate change, but has 
limited support and political influence (Ancygier, 2013).  
Second, the four state-owned electric power groups form a “social bloc” particularly 
in their opposition to carbon pricing, protection of coal and laws aimed at stimulating 
decentralized renewables. These groups guard their position—and fear what they see in 
Germany, where large German utilities have been outperformed by a renewables policy 
based on feed-in tariffs, with a surge in new decentralized renewable-power production 
followed by the shut-down of conventional power plants. The major electric power groups 
have significant influence of policymaking. These groups are partly owned by the Ministry of 
Treasury, and their key resource—coal—are supported by virtually all political parties. No 
                                                             
7 The carbon price plunged from nearly EUR 30 in spring 2008 to just above EUR 5 in spring 2014. 
8 This study was prepared by the Center for Climate Policy Analysis, established by the Ministry of Environment, the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy.  
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political party has taken a clear position on limiting the role of coal in the economy 
(Bukowski, 2013:197).   
Implementation of the EU climate and energy package has also made the 
government more coherent in its opposition. In 2009, Poland’s Ministry of the Environment 
(responsible for climate policy) and its Ministry of Economy (responsible for energy policy) 
signed a new integrated strategy—the first time that representatives from these ministries 
sat around the same table to develop a joint strategy. The result was a common strategy for 
“Energy Security and the Environment,” which formed one part of a larger nine-point 
national strategy towards 2020 (Ministry of Environment, 2013). The Ministry of the 
Environment, the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Finance joined forces in a Center 
for Climate Policy Analysis to assess the (negative) implications of EU climate and energy 
policy for Poland (World Bank, 2011; Boratyński et al., 2014).  
The broad-based societal and governmental resistance and increased coherency has 
led to challenges regarding implementation. Poland has made systematic efforts to make the 
ETS fit with its coal-based electricity production also after the adoption of the revised ETS 
Directive. Poland exploited derogations for free allowances in the power sector to reinforce 
coal power; it did not decide to use auctioning revenues for climate projects; and it opposed 
benchmark rules based on products, arguing that the fuel-mix should (i.e. coal) be taken into 
account (Skjærseth, 2014).9  Poland also opposed Commission initiatives to stabilize and 
increase the carbon price. Still, and somewhat paradoxically, the low carbon price coinciding 
with the ‘strengthening’ of the ETS made the trading system less threatening to polish coal 
than expected. 
Implementation of the Renewable Energy Directive has also had a bumpy ride in 
Poland. The implementation process has been characterized by draft legal proposals, 
consultations, amendments and new draft proposals (Ancygier, 2013). A recurrent issue has 
been whether new legislation should reduce support for co-firing biomass and coal 
supported by the big energy groups or increase support for less mature technologies and 
smaller local energy groups by means of feed-in tariffs. The RED includes a binding target for 
Poland to increase the share of renewable energy sources from 7.2% in 2005 to 15% by 2020 
                                                             
9 Resistance proved generally unsuccessful: Poland lost in most instances, and had to accept the Commission’s 
interpretation through Court rulings or the will of the qualified majority. 
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(of gross final energy consumption) along a trajectory of interim targets. In March 2013, the 
Commission referred Poland to the European Court of Justice for failure to transpose the 
Renewable Energy Directive, and proposed high daily penalties based on the duration and 
gravity of this infringement (Skjærseth, 2014).  The RED was finally transposed in 2015, 
nearly five years after the EU deadline.  
For Poland, CCS could provide an opportunity to combine its coal industry with an 
ambitious climate policy. Implementation of the CCS Directive in Poland has been a lengthy 
and somewhat confusing process. The Polish government (the Ministry of the Environment 
and the Ministry of Economy) aimed to construct two large demonstration projects by 2015 
as part of the wider EU CCS program (IEA, 2011). Both projects have now been cancelled, 
due mainly to lack of funding, but also because of legal barriers following the late and 
deficient transposition of the CCS Directive (ClientEarth 2013, p. 42; Jendroska 2014). The 
lack of funding is due in part to the low carbon price, which has weakened the NER-300 and 
generally provided scant incentives for CCS investments. And so, this low-carbon opportunity 
particularly tailored for coal plants and for countries like Poland is defunct, at least for the 
time being.  
The Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) establishes differentiated annual national GHG 
emissions targets for the non-ETS sectors, 2005–2020. As a relatively poor EU country, 
Poland is allowed to increase its emissions by 14% in sectors not covered by the ETS. Despite 
slow progress, Poland has projected 2020 ESD emissions below the 2020 annual targets 
under current national policies and measures. However, challenges may arise in the 
transport sector (OECD 2012:112). If Poland does not succeed, the ESD includes several 
flexibility mechanisms that will ensure goal attainment. Projections indicate a large surplus 
of AEAs in the EU by 2020 (EEA, 2014). The economic crisis has contributed significantly to 
this situation by reducing activity in the non-ETS sectors, transport in particular (Eurostat, 
2015).  
 
Implementation experiences and change in preferences  
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Poland clearly fits into the “mainly negative experience” category. It was not pleased with 
the package, which did not fit well with the country’s energy-economic situation, climate 
policies, or negotiating positions. The synergies envisaged by the EU as regards “green” jobs, 
innovation, and keeping coal carbon-neutral through CCS have failed to materialize. Quite 
the contrary: climate and energy concerns have increasingly clashed. Carbon pricing and 
renewable subsidies are seen as threatening to indigenous coal, impinging on national 
energy security. Implementation of the RED has proven extremely politically contentious. 
Growth in the share of renewables has done little to reduce Poland’s energy-import 
dependency: instead, import dependency has risen, alongside the increase in renewables 
(Eurostat 2007; 2014). Subsidies to promote renewable energy have only to a limited extent 
spurred “green” growth in terms of new jobs, as a result of co-firing biomass and coal as the 
preferred option. Dissatisfaction with the EU package came to a head in 2012, when the 
main opposition party presented—albeit unsuccessfully—a resolution in the Parliament 
calling for renegotiation of the EU climate and energy package (Skjærseth, 2014).  
These experiences resulted in systematic but varying opposition to more ambitious 
long-term EU policies (Ministry of the Environment, 2013b; Ibec, 2013). The experiences 
were shared by several other CEECs (Skjærseth et al, 2016). First, Poland opposed new 
national targets on renewables, arguing that subsidies for renewables in the energy 
production sector should be withdrawn. Second, CCS had now come to be seen as 
obstructing the development of clean-coal technologies. Third, the EU ETS had proved less 
threatening than expected and should be the main instrument for reducing GHG emissions 
in the EU. Fourth, Poland accepted continuation of effort sharing in the non-ETS sectors 
based on GDP/Cap. Finally, a new, binding GHG target should be made conditional on 
agreement at the COP21 in Paris 2015, and be adopted afterwards. All this indicates some 
interesting changes in preferences for 2030 compared to the “baseline”: 
o Opposition to the EU ETS had apparently eased.  This can be linked to few domestic 
implementation obligations, a low carbon price, and a large surplus of allowances 
that would prevent a high carbon price by 2030 in the absence of adequate 
countermeasures.   
o Poland had initially welcomed CCS, but no longer. This can be linked to challenges in 
implementing the CCS Directive and the complete failure in building CCS pilot plants. 
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o Poland had initially accepted the RED, but was now unwilling to accept new binding 
national targets. This can be linked to implementation challenges and negative 
implementation experiences.  
o Poland did not change position on the ESD based on GDP/Cap. The ESD target for 
2020 can be reached in the absence of new policies and measures   
The low priority of climate change also indicates that the implementation of the EU climate 
and energy has not affected social norms in the direction of needs for future generations. 
Moreover, Poland does not share the EU-leadership-by-example vision. On the contrary, 
Poland has since 2007 consistently argued that the EU should base its climate policy on the 
outcome of the international negotiations and not the other way around.   
 
4. Linking change in preferences to new EU 2030 policies  
 
In January 2014, the Commission adopted the 2030 proposal, based on consultations with 
member states and other stakeholders, which included a 40% reduction of GHGs as binding 
unilateral target to be achieved by ETS and non-ETS sectors—thus signaling a departure from 
international flexibility (Commission, 2014). A renewable energy target of at least 27% by 
2030 was proposed, but at the EU level only: this was slightly above expected developments 
in Commission “business-as-usual” scenarios (24%) and would not be translated into new 
and binding national targets. CCS was not mentioned, and no new CCS goals were proposed.
 Initial responses to the Commission’s proposal showed deep divisions among two 
groups of states. The first was the Green Growth Group, an informal grouping of like-minded 
energy, climate, and environment ministers from 13 EU member-states, plus European 
Economic Area-member Norway. This group issued a joint statement prior to the March 
2014 European Council, endorsing the core elements as set out by the Commission (Green 
Growth Group, 2014).The other group was led by Poland, supported by other CEECs that 
agreed on a common list of demands.10 Their major points were full national sovereignty 
                                                             
10 The Visegrad Group Countries, Romania and Bulgaria Joint Paper on the EU climate and energy framework 2020–2030. 




over the energy mix and protection of coal, more EU subsidies to modernize energy systems, 
and a heavier burden on the “rich” EU countries that were arguing for a more ambitious 
climate policy. Compared to Poland’s earlier veto of the 2050 roadmaps, the focus on 
demands could be said to signal a somewhat more constructive attitude probably as a result 
of preferences already taken into account by the Commission on CCS and renewables. 
The adoption of climate and energy targets and policies for 2030 required unanimity 
in the European Council, as with the targets and policies for 2020. Poland demanded that 
targets and policies be negotiated together in one round, in order to get control over the 
subsequent development of legislation based on a new framework. The position of Poland in 
alliance with other CEECs led to a sense of drama in the summer and early autumn of 2014.  
In October 2014, the European Council adopted a compromise on the new 2030 
climate and energy framework—which included the new binding domestic reduction goal of 
at least 40% reduction in GHG emissions, 27% increase in renewable energy consumption 
(binding only at EU level), and an indicative target of 27% increase in energy efficiency. 
Poland thus accepted new 2030 EU policies as the principal climate policy instrument before 
the Paris climate negotiations in December 2015. Concessions granted to Poland and its 
allies included the text of the first paragraph in the conclusions from the heads of states and 
governments, which states that the European Council will keep all the elements of the 
framework under review and will continue to provide strategic orientations as appropriate—
notably with respect to consensus on ETS, non-ETS, interconnections, and energy efficiency 
(European Council 2014). This paragraph would appear to give Poland greater control over 
subsequent legislative development. Second, the European Council would “revert” to the 
framework after Paris—a formulation which could also be interpreted as a concession to 
Poland.  
Several further concessions were given to Poland and other low-income CEEC 
member-states, including ETS auctioning derogations for the electric power sector, and 
subsidies through various funds. A new “modernization fund” has been designed to give 
Poland over 40% of the revenues for modernizing its energy sector. No new goals or policies 
for CCS have been adopted. Finally, the framework recognizes indigenous coal and shale gas 
as important for energy-security options. Full respect for the freedom of member-states to 
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determine their energy mix has been explicitly included, and the new renewable-energy goal 
is linked to a rather vague section on (energy) governance and the idea of an Energy Union.  
The Council would ‘revert’ to the framework after Paris – indicating that the targets 
might be adjusted in light of the outcome. The 1.5oC aspirational goal agreed in Paris created 
a ‘distance’ between the Paris Agreement and EU targets which are based on the ‘80–95% by 
2050’ to limit global warming to 2.0oC (European Council, 2009). Nevertheless, the 
Commission and the European Council have concluded that the EU 2020 and 2030 targets 




Poland did not favor most of the components in the EU climate and energy package of 
policies adopted by unanimity in 2008 to attain 2020 climate and related energy targets 
(Table 1). In particular, it opposed the EU ETS that puts a price on carbon and thereby 
punishes coal hardest.  However, Poland did not veto the package. Although difficult to 
verify, there are various plausible reasons. When Poland entered the EU in 2004, it lacked 
experience of how the EU works. That the 20-20-20 targets were followed by ambitious new 
and binding EU policies apparently came as a surprise. Second, Poland had not undertaken 
proper assessments of the internal impacts before the package was adopted. Third, Poland 
was persuaded by the Commission as regards advantages, as with CCS, ‘green’ growth and 
funding to modernize the energy system. Fourth, there could be significant political costs in 
other issue-areas for Poland by vetoing the package. Finally, Poland succeeded in obtaining 




















ETS Opposed/accepted Mixed Accepted Key pillar 
RED Accepted Mainly negative Opposed Binding national 
targets abolished 
CCS Welcomed Mainly negative Opposed No new policies 
and targets 
ESD Accepted Mixed Accepted Key pillar 
 
From 2009, the package was implemented domestically. Four observations stand out. First, a 
certain “distance” could by identified between Polish policies and preferences put forward in 
the negotiations and the final EU outcome. This would serve to activate different types of 
societal and governmental responses. Second, the costs have been concentrated to specific 
and politically influential societal groups, whereas the benefits are seemingly insignificant. 
Third, how affectedness is perceived appears to be a more important concern than actual 
affectedness. Targets and policies for 2020 are seen as the start of a long-term process 
towards decarbonizing the EU by 2050. This is perceived to threaten indigenous Polish coal 
and energy security. The energy groups as well as households fearing increase in electricity 
prices have effectively channeled their resistance to decision-makers. Fourth, we have noted 
an interesting institutional consequence. The EU climate and energy package improved the 
coordination between relevant ministries and enhanced the internal unity of governmental 
preferences. This has most likely enhanced Poland’s influence on the 2030 reform. We have 
no indications that implementation has stimulated social norms in favor of the needs of 
future generations or the actions of other member-states more inclined to take climate 
action. On the contrary, the EU climate and energy package has apparently provoked 
governmental and societal actors and fueled opposition.  The economic crisis unfolding 
when the package was implemented might seem an obvious explanation for mainly negative 
implementation experiences in Poland. However, Poland was the only EU member state to 
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experience economic growth throughout the crisis. The crisis led falling emissions which 
actually made implementation easier and less costly.   
The implementation experiences of the climate and energy package caused some 
interesting changes in Polish preferences for specific EU 2030 policies (Table 1). On the one 
hand, CCS had failed and Poland did not favor CCS any longer, and strongly opposed new, 
binding national targets as to renewable energy based on mainly negative implementation 
experiences. On the other hand, the EU ETS had not led to significant costs as expected, as a 
result of the financial crisis, falling EU emissions and the low carbon price for the ETS sectors. 
Preferences for the ESD covering the non-ETS sectors did not significantly change. Poland 
achieved a generous deal on the ESD back in 2008 and expects to reach its 2020 target 
without any new policies and measures. Moreover, Poland’s new preferences for long-term 
EU policies became more internally coordinated, and shifted from vetoing long-term 
roadmaps to demands for 2030 policies.  
Implementation experiences and change in preferences on specific policies fed into 
and influenced the negotiations on the new EU 2030 climate and energy framework, both 
through the Commission consultations and directly in the European Council negotiations. 
Poland was followed by several other CEECs with similar implementation experiences 
(Skjærseth et al., 2016). The outcome of the EU policy reforms for 2030 shows that new EU 
2030 framework represents a “re-packaging” compromise to satisfy the main veto players, 
with substantial concessions to Poland and other CEECs. The agreement clearly reflects 
varying experiences with implementation—including poor experiences with implementing 
CCS and the RED. No new targets for CCS have been adopted—and CCS is the key solution 
for bridging the gap between climate-policy and energy-security concerns, particularly for 
member-states relying on indigenous coal. The renewable energy target has been somewhat 
strengthened at EU level (from 20 to 27%), but has also been weakened by the absence of 
new, binding national targets for attaining the EU target. The combination of binding 
national renewables targets and support schemes for 2020 has proved essential for 
promoting greater renewable-energy consumption in the EU (Skjærseth, et al. 2016).  
The GHG emissions target has been significantly strengthened by raising the level of 
ambition from 20 to 40% and by excluding import of external credits for meeting the target. 
The EU ETS and the Effort Sharing Decision were identified as the main instruments for 
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attaining the 40% GHG reduction target. Implementation of these instruments for 2020  has 
entailed significantly less costs and implementation efforts than expected before the 
financial crisis fully unfolded. However, the 2030 EU climate and energy framework must be 
specified through further detailed legislation that will determine the full ambitiousness of 
the 2030 policies. As the reform process stands now, a tentative conclusion is that some EU 
policies have been re-packaged (RED and CCS), whereas GHG reductions based on the ETS 
and the ESD target have become more ambitious.  
Nevertheless, the EU 2030 climate and energy framework mirrors Polish preferences 
only partly, even though it was adopted by unanimity and contains several concessions to 
Poland. As Poland and its allies accepted a 40% domestic GHG reduction target already 
before the December 2015 COP21, implementation experiences and the preferences of the 
‘least ambitious’ member states are clearly not the only explanation of the outcome. There 
are various plausible reasons linked to LI, MLG, and Supranationalism explanations. First, 
several other member-states—including Germany, the UK, and France—pushed for the 40% 
target. For Poland, the political costs of not giving anything would be extremely high. 
Second, issue-linkages can prove effective for raising ambitiousness under unanimity. EU 
climate and energy policies take the form of policy packages that provide compensation and 
enhance the scope for mutual benefits. Third, the European Commission and the European 
Parliament pushed for ambitious 2030 targets and policies. Finally, the EU has aimed at a 
leadership-by-example role in international climate policies since the 1990s. The EU would 
lose all credibility if it had not submitted an ambitious INDC well before Paris. The 
combination of these factors contributed to “soften” Polish resistance. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has explored to what extent, how and why domestic implementation experiences 
affect national preferences and subsequent reform of EU targets and policies. Poland was 
selected as a critical case (under unanimity) as the “least ambitious” member-state; it has 
also frequently acted as a leader for other likeminded CEECs.   
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We can conclude that the EU has only partly succeeded in gathering momentum 
through a “snowball effect” whereby positive feedback from implementation generates 
further steps. The analysis of implementation indicates mixed and negative experiences in 
Poland rather than a ‘positive’ feedback. Studies of other member states also show 
significant variation in implementation experiences between countries and policies. An 
alternative development based on the economists’ “law of diminishing returns” cannot be 
ruled out. Here, the first steps are likely to be the easy ones. According to this “law,” it 
would become increasingly difficult and costly to promote new joint policies; and 
governments and societal actors would gradually become more reluctant as regards 
implementing them.  The jury is still out on this. Before 2018, the EU will have to adopt a 
range of binding climate and energy policies that must be implemented to deliver on the 
2030 framework as a step stone towards 2050 decarbonization.  
 In the meantime, we can point to some conditions to speculate as to what may drive 
Poland towards a ‘greener’ pathway in the future. Several comprehensive, independent 
studies have held that the transition to a low-carbon economy in Poland will benefit 
investors and economic growth, reduce energy consumption, develop technology, create 
jobs, raise the level of energy security, and improve health (see e.g. Bukowski, 2013). 
Adaptation pressure from the EU is likely to grow for the ETS sectors with the recently 
adopted Market Stability Reserve. Higher carbon prices towards 2030 will make new 
investments in domestic coal increasingly risky. The EU pressure in favour of renewables will 
probably recede, but renewables – particularly solar – is getting cheaper and may become 
competitive without state subsidies. Domestic politics may also change. Social demands and 
organizations pushing for climate policies may increase and become stronger. This potential 
pressure from ‘below’ may affect the priorities of (some) political parties on future climate 
and energy policies. Finally, a stronger decentralized renewable industry as a result of RED 
transposition may gradually reduce the political influence of the major coal based electric 
power companies. 
Lessons can be drawn from EU experiences with climate policy initiation, adoption, 
implementation and reform. With the Paris Agreement, domestic implementation will 
become increasingly important for practitioners and scholars. The Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDCs) need to be implemented domestically to attain targets by 
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2025 or 2030.  As climate change is a long-term challenge towards 2050 and 2100, national 
targets and policies will have to be adopted, implemented and reformed in several rounds in 
order to deliver on the 2oC target and the intended 1.5oC target in the Paris Agreement. This 
dynamic feature has been made mandatory, obliging the parties to communicate new INDCs 
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